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01
November
2011

AN ASSESSMENT OF PUBLIC PROCUREMENT MANAGEMENT IN VANUATU

Description of the assessment

Objectives

The objectives of this assessment are to discuss:
the strengths and weaknesses of the GoV procurement system; and
opportunities and priorities for improvement.

The assessment is primarily intended to support development of terms of reference for procurement capacity building assistance.  It is also intended to be useful as a source of information, or at least tie in with, future investigations of the GoV procurement system.

Background

The Ministry of Finance and Economic Management (MFEM) has requested technical assistance to improve procurement management in the Government of Vanuatu (GoV).

Procurements are required to follow the Government Contracts and Tenders Act 1998 (the GCT Act) if they are for amounts of more than 5 million vatu and the requirements of the Finance Regulations if they are for amounts less than this.

The GCT Act establishes a Tenders Board which centrally manages all procurements for more than 5 million vatu, with the involvement of agencies that are funding them.  The Tenders Board is administratively positioned within the Ministry of Finance and Economic Management (MFEM), but there is a plan to move it to a proposed new Department of Finance and Treasury.  Procurements for 5 million vatu or less are managed by the agencies funding them, in accordance with the Finance Regulations.  All procurement transactions are recorded in the financial management information system centrally managed by the Department of Finance (DoF).

The 2009 Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) assessment for Vanuatu has identified competition, value for money and controls in procurement as a significant weakness.  Anecdotal reports suggest that there are widespread problems with procurement management, perhaps more because of lack of procurement system development and prevailing attitudes to procurement among senior officials rather than an entrenched system of malpractice.  A recent review of procurement management in the Ministry of Health (AusAID, September 2009) demonstrated that there are, in that Ministry, serious risks to the effective, efficient and lawful use of AusAID funding when managed using the Government’s procurement system.  The problems found, essentially resulting from a lack of internal control, are because of their nature likely to be more widespread among agencies and to affect recurrent as well as donor funding.

So there is a clear need for assistance but the shape of that assistance is not clear.  An assessment of the current system is needed to support design of the assistance.

The Director of the Department of Finance, also a member of the GFG management committee, agreed that the GFG Public Financial Management (PFM) Coordinator (the assessor) should make an assessment of the current system, and also to facilitate engagement of the Tenders Board.  The Secretary of the Tenders Board has endorsed the Director’s decision and supports this assessment.

In the interests of promoting ownership and harmonisation, the assessor has considered other parties that may have an interest in this assessment and also how it fits in with existing or planned work on public procurement.  The internal audit units of MoH, MoE and DoF are planning to undertake procurement assessments severally but also possibly jointly.  Donors have a strong interest in procurement assessment. AusAID is increasingly using the GoV procurement system and  the issue of ‘fiduciary risk management’ is becoming prominent.  NZAid has recently indicated interest in funding a procurement assessment but this has not progressed. Direct budget support from the European Union is tied to GoV progress on implementing a program of PFM reform, which includes an assessment of national procurement.  The assessment methodology has been chosen taking these initiatives and interests into account.

Methodology

The methodology selected, the OECD Development Assistance Committee’s Methodology for Assessment of National Procurement Systems, is considered relevant to the assessment’s objective and credible for both of its intended uses (to support development of procurement capacity building assistance and provide a useable source of information on the GoV procurement system).  This OECD methodology ‘has been designed to enable a country to conduct a self‑assessment of its procurement system to determine strengths and weaknesses, or to help development agencies carry out joint or external assessment of a country’s procurement system’  and has ‘capacity development as a core objective’.

The OECD methodology is based on the application of two sets of indicators.  The Base‑Line Indicators (BLI) ‘present a snapshot comparison of the actual system against international standards’ for procurement management.  The Compliance/Performance Indicators (CPI) examine ‘prevailing procurement practices’.  In the Vanuatu context it is not possible to apply the CPIs as they rely on statistical information that is not available (as found by the recent PEFA assessment).  Nonetheless, application of the BLIs provides enough information to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the procurement system, at least for the purposes of developing terms of reference for technical assistance.

For each BLI, the assessor applies a score from 0 to 3, based on the application of set criteria. ‘A score of 3 indicates full achievement of the stated standard.  A score of 2 is given when the system exhibits less than full achievement and needs some improvements in the area being assessed and a score of 1 is for those areas where substantive work is needed for the system to meet the standard.  A rating of 0 is the residual indicating a failure to meet the proposed standard.’  There are no fractional scores.

To supplement the BLIs, the assessment includes further information which the assessor considers relevant to draw out the strengths and weaknesses of the system.  This exercise of judgement is reasonable given the assessor’s knowledge of local procurement practices and of complex procurement standards.  In this regard it is worth noting that the assessor was formerly a Senior Director in the Australian National Audit Office and was responsible for performance audits of high value, complex procurements of goods and services.  In some cases too, the criteria for rating some indicators (2e, 2f, 3b, 6a, 8a) were not completely clear and so the assessor exercised judgement to determine the rating for these indicators.

The OECD methodology does not prescribe how results should be compiled, analysed and presented, which is appropriate given that the methodology must be adapted to the particular circumstances of each country.  This assessment takes a two stage approach:

a summary of the scores from application of the BLIs, to give a general sense of the strengths and weaknesses in the procurement system, this is presented in the Findings from application of the indicators section of this report; and
a more in-depth analysis of the components of the system, seeking to identify opportunities for capacity development (and by extension for technical assistance).  This is presented in the Opportunities for improvement section of this report.

This assessment is based on a review of GoV procurement documentation, other written material, interviews and the assessor’s own observation of, and participation in, procurement processes.  Details of sources of information are at Attachment A.

Findings from application of the indicators

The full results for the BLIs are shown at Attachment B.  While it is not possible to assess the CPIs, they are recorded in Attachment B to provide a complete baseline assessment using the OECD DAC methodology, in case others wish at some point to compare the situation in future with the one now.  Table 1 shows the aggregated results for the BLIs.

Table 1: Summary of GoV procurement system scores for BLI


Baseline Indicator

Score

Pillar I. Legislative and regulatory framework

1. The public procurement legislative and regulatory framework

1

2. Implementing regulations and documentation

1

Pillar II. Institutional Framework and Management Capacity

3. Integration and mainstreaming of the public procurement system into the public sector governance system

1

4. Normative and regulatory functions

1

5. Institutional development capacity

0

Pillar III.  Procurement Operations and Market Practices

6. Efficiency of procurement practices

0

7. Functionality of the public procurement market

0

8. Existence of contract administration and dispute resolution provisions

0

Pillar IV.  Integrity and Transparency of the Public Procurement System

9. Effectiveness of control and audit systems

1

10.  Efficiency of appeals mechanism

0

11.  Accessibility to information

1

12.  Ethics and anti-corruption policy and measures

0

Overall, the scores indicate that the public procurement system requires substantial attention to achieve the standards set out by the OECD DAC. However, it is also necessary to ask why Vanuatu should move towards these standards?  What benefits will achieving them yield? Will the benefits outweigh the costs?  Who will implement improvements, particularly as Indicator 5 suggests that the GoV has no capacity, currently, to pursue them?  In the next section the strengths and weaknesses identified by the indicators are assessed with these questions in mind to identify opportunities and priorities for improvement.

Opportunities for improvement

1.  The public procurement and legislative and regulatory framework

While overall the GoV framework rated ‘1’ on this indicator, the sub-indicators show that the framework is quite strong in some respects but has gaps in it.

The primary piece of legislation is the GCT Act, introduced in 1998 as part of the GoV’s Comprehensive Reform Program.  In many respects it seems to be quite a serviceable piece of legislation.  It mandates competitive tendering for large scale procurements, prohibits splitting of procurements to avoid this requirement and sets up regulation and management arrangements: these are all important attributes.  However, it has not been substantially reviewed in the ten years since its introduction and it needs a review along the lines of the one recently completed on the Public Finance and Economic Management Act.  The sub-indicators suggest some matters that could receive attention, including:

advertising rules and time limits;
rules for participation in competitive processes and selection;
content of bidding documentation;
opening of tenders;
management of complaints and review of administrative decisions.

Other issues specific to the Vanuatu context also need to be considered in a review.  Some will be covered in the discussion of specific indicators below, but for now:

the lower financial limit for tenders of more than 5 million vatu was set in 1998 and needs to be reviewed;
the financial limit is the primary criterion for triggering a competitive process, it may be worth considering other criteria, for example public interest, donor expectations, development of local markets and so on;
what constitutes a ‘tender’ process is not made clear;
the role of the Council of Ministers, which is to approve Tenders Board recommendations for entering into every contract of more than 5 million vatu, is unwieldy, impractical and inappropriate.

Whether these and other matters should be dealt with in legislation or in supporting regulations is another question and one that needs to be considered in a review.

2.  Implementing regulations and documentation

The Tenders Regulation Order was signed in 1999 and has not been updated since then.  It is weak in terms of specifying procurement processes and procedures, for example it does not address pre-qualification for considering tenders, or establish financial limits and other criteria for selecting an appropriate competitive process.  It is overly prescriptive on minor administrative matters and misses the bigger picture in terms of providing a structure for achieving objectives such as value for money and fair and effective competition.

The Guidelines for the Procurement of Goods and Services (the Guidelines) were prepared in 2005 as part of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Management Institutional Strengthening project.  While this document is very solid in terms of the principles and processes it contains, it is virtually unknown in government and so is not applied. Perhaps this is partly because it is in complex English and it is long, which makes it difficult to follow for English speakers and unusable for French speakers.  It also appears to be a ‘side door’ approach to providing procurement guidance, in the sense that it is issued under the authority of the Director General of Finance under section 63 of the Public Finance and Economic Management Act rather than through the primary procurement legislation, the GCT Act.

The Tender Regulations Order and the Guidelines need to be reviewed in conjunction with the legislation.

Supporting documentation for officers procuring goods and services is either weak or non-existent.  Guidance and standard tender terms are provided through the Guidelines but these have not been updated for five years and are not broadly available.  The assessor sighted examples of standard form tenders used by the Public Works Department but they are not for more general use and application.  The assessor did not find any general conditions of contract and observed that contracts are developed case by case.

An emerging issue is the increasing use by donors of government systems, which will put pressure on already stretched capacity for managing procurement.  Capacity will need to be expanded and developed to handle more complex procurements, including in some cases international bidding processes.

3)  Integration and mainstreaming of the procurement system into the public sector governance system

There is no connection between purchasing and the planning, budget development and budget development cycle, except for donor funded projects which have capital components.  There are opportunities for improved integration of the procurement system into public sector governance.  Drawing from the OECD indicators, these might include:

  • developing forward procurement plans as part of agency planning processes and incorporating the costs into budget submissions;
  • certification of funds availability before major procurement processes are commenced;
  • commitment of funding allocations for major procurements so that they can only be spent for their intended purpose;
  • enforcing completion reports for major contracts.

These are quite specific suggestions and before implementing them, or something like them, there needs to be higher level consideration of how procurement management should fit into the public sector governance system.  Procurement management is about ensuring the effectiveness, efficiency and probity of procurement processes.  But these objectives are not ends in themselves, they support high quality public expenditure - expenditure which assists the government achieve its policy and program objectives.

The link between procurement management and public financial management one is an essential one to make and needs to be considered in the context of the legislative framework review. The PFEM Act has recently been significantly amended and there is a need to ensure that the implications of these amendments are addressed in a review of the GCT Act and regulations.  For example:

The definition of public money in the PFEM Act now includes money received from donors. The GCT Act applies to public money, so there is an urgent need to consider how procurement processes utilising donor funds should be conducted.
The roles and responsibilities for the use of public money have been clarified in the PFEM Act.  The PFEM Act requires that the head of an agency must manage the affairs of the agency in a way that promotes the efficient, effective and ethical use of the public resources and the public money for which the head of the agency is responsible.  By extension heads of agencies (Director-Generals and heads of ministerial offices) are responsible for procurement, so there is a need to define their roles further.
There is an inconsistency between the PFEM Act requirement that heads of agencies take responsibility for the expenditure of public money and the GCT Act requirement that the Council of Ministers approve the award of all contracts for goods and services valued at more than 5 million vatu.

4) Normative and regulatory functions

Normative and regulatory functions are primarily assigned to the Tenders Board through the Contracts and Tenders Act.  Administratively, the Tenders Board secretariat is positioned within the Ministry of Finance and Economic Management (MFEM), however the Board itself is responsible to the Minister of Finance and so is a separate entity to MFEM.  At the time of writing the Public Service Commission is considering an administrative arrangements change that would see the Tenders Board secretariat included in a new contract management section within the MFEM’s new Department of Finance and Treasury.  However for the moment the MFEM’s Department of Finance also has normative and regulatory functions which it exercises separately from the Tenders Board through the Public Finance and Economic Management Act and the Finance Regulations.

The OECD DAC suggests that normative and regulatory bodies (however organised) should exercise a set of responsibilities that include, but are not restricted to, the following:
‘providing advice to contracting entities;
drafting amendments to the legislative and regulatory framework and implementing regulations;
monitoring public procurement;
providing procurement information;
managing statistical databases;
reporting on procurement to other parts of government;
developing and supporting implementation of initiatives for improvement in the public procurement system; and
providing implementation tools and documents to support training and capacity development of implementing staff.’

These responsibilities are not defined in the legislative and regulatory framework and for the most part are not practiced.  The OECD DAC indicators also point to other issues:
the two entities are also closely involved in procurement transactions, which raises issues of potential conflicts of interest;
the Tenders Board is under-resourced to carry out the kinds of responsibilities appropriate for a normative/regulatory entity.

Presently it is not clear whether or not the new administrative arrangements will be approved and implemented.  Key matters to be addressed either way will include:
Ensuring that regulatory responsibilities are adequately picked up;
clear articulation and appropriate division of responsibilities for regulation, contracts and tenders management and operations, and procurement advising to the Government.  As mentioned above heads of agencies have responsibility for procurement and this needs to be considered ;
appropriate resourcing of these various functions;
job design and specification for people involved in these various functions.

5)  Institutional development capacity

The score of ‘0’ for every sub-indicator reflects the lack of capacity in GoV to monitor the performance of the procurement system and to develop and implement sustainable improvements in it.  In the past the GoV has relied on aid donor funded assistance to improve aspects of procurement.  Primary donor inputs over the last ten years include:
the ADB funded Comprehensive Reform Program, which resulted in the Contracts and Tenders Act and Tenders Board; and
support for the procurement management function provided through the AusAID MFEM Institutional Strengthening Project;
support for agencies involved in specific procurements, most notably for the Ministry of Health’s central medical store which organises twice yearly purchases of drugs for use in public health facilities.

These inputs have developed some elements of an operable procurement system, but have not given the GoV the capacity to sustain and develop the system.  A challenge for future assistance is to take a holistic and focussed long term approach to give the GoV the best chance to develop a sustainable procurement system.

6) Efficiency of procurement operations and practices

The OECD DAC provides a specific definition of efficiency, which is that ‘operational practices result in timely award of contracts at competitive market prices as determined by effective and fair implementation of procurement procedures’.  This is an odd definition of efficiency, which in performance management terms is about the relationship between inputs and outputs.  It seems to the assessor that this indicator is about how well the system operates in practice.  The combined score for the sub- indicators is ‘0’ which suggests that the system does not function at all.  This is not the case; it is more accurate as a general statement to say that contracts can be effectively awarded but not consistently enough.

This is a second order indicator in the sense that the issues discussed above under indicators 1 to 5 need to be addressed to improve the score on this indicator.  One strategy that might relate specifically to this indicator, though, is for donors to invest in the procurement system by using it.  By doing this they can identify risks and weaknesses relating to the specific procurements that they are involved in and by addressing them with GoV they can produce more general systemic improvements.  Guiding and controlling donors’ use of the procurement system will be an important component of capacity building.

7) Functionality of the public procurement market

This indicator is about the readiness of potential suppliers to respond to Government demands for goods and services.  The overall rating of ‘0’ for this indicator suggests that there is, at present, no sense of a need to build a partnership between Government and potential suppliers.  In the main this results from two factors: an underdeveloped market and the lack of procurement management capacity in Government.  There are likely to be opportunities to improve here, but any initiatives need to be based on a very clear awareness of the current limitations of the market and the benefits of promoting partnership.  Limitations of the market include limited competition, high cost of supply of imported items and limited distribution points.  Benefit that might be sought by GoV is the development of ni-Vanuatu owned and operated businesses and community involvement

8) Existence of contract administration and dispute resolution procedures

This indicator relates to how contracts are managed once a supplier has been engaged.  The public procurement framework rating for this indicator is ‘0’.   This score needs to be interpreted carefully because the OECD DAC takes a very specific view of what appropriate dispute resolution procedures are, and their applicability in the Vanuatu context needs to be considered further before they are adopted here.

It is true to say that contract administration responsibilities are not clearly defined in the legal framework or contract standard clauses across the board.  These responsibilities should include, according to the OECD DAC, product acceptance procedures, quality control and payment procedures.  These kinds of procedures seem applicable to very large scale contracts and require a strong legal framework to implement. Often donors will manage contracts. So there is a question about what benefit will be achieved by specifying contract administration responsibilities.  This is not to say the issue should not be considered in a capacity building program, but that it should be approached with caution lest the Government implement procedures that it can neither carry out nor enforce.  Also, procedures will need to be tailored to fit different situations: the contract administration procedures for a major medical supply contract will be very different to those in, say, a contract for basic road maintenance made with a local community.

The OECD DAC standards for dispute resolution focus heavily on arbitration and so-called Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) procedures.  They also set as a condition country membership of the New York Convention on the enforcement of international arbitration awards.  While it is fair to say that the only recourse for disputes is the courts in Vanuatu, adopting the OECD DAC standards needs to be very carefully considered as it seems they are framed around international competition and business practices, the benefits of which to Vanuatu need to be assessed.

9)  The country has effective control and audit systems

The rating of ‘1’ for this indicator is consistent with the 2009 PEFA assessment which rates the effectiveness of internal audit (PI-21) as ‘C’ and the scope, nature and follow-up of external audit (PI-26) as ‘D’.  The detailed findings also summarise the situation quite well:
controls over procurement are ineffective and consequently there is, overall, a high risk of fraud;
audits are not systematically programmed and recommendations are not generally followed up; however
there are internal audit procedures and there are consultants assisting to build capacity in internal audits.

It will be important for capacity building efforts to tie in with efforts being made to improve the broader control framework within which procurement must operate.

10)  Efficiency of the appeals mechanism

There is no complaints review/appeals mechanism, apart from the courts, so the OECD sub-indicators are mostly not assessable.  However, one refers to publication of decisions, and court decisions are published and it is only for this reason is a rating offered here.

As there is no mechanism, the first step is to design one. Consideration of how one might look needs to takes into account the scale of procurements and of Vanuatu itself.

11) Degrees of access to information

This indicator relates to public access to procurement information.  As Vanuatu does not have a public information system of the kind envisaged by the OECD DAC, it rates ‘1’, which means that information is limited and hard to get.  There is a requirement for major contracts to be gazetted, it is up to the procuring entities to provide more information, which rarely happens unless there is a political imperative to either get credit from or defend a procurement.  A first step will be to define the kinds of information that should be made available to the public, mindful of the benefits that will come from its release and the costs of compiling and publishing it.

12) The country has ethics and anti-corruption measures in place

The legal and regulatory framework has ethics, but not specific anti-corruption, measures in place through the Leadership Code Act.  The PFEM Act and Finance Regulations can also be read to have anti-corruption components.  The major problem is that the provisions of the framework are not consistently or widely implemented.  Indeed it is fair to say that implementation is selective and the assessor is aware of cases where selection is politically motivated.  As mentioned before, there is a significant question to be asked about the attitudes of many politicians and senior officials to procurement.  Are they really interested in changing current practice?  There are some senior officials who would like to see change and the current Minister of Finance and Economic Management is a supporter.  Capacity building assistance will need to key into this support, be guided by it and work at the pace set by the supporters themselves.  At the same time capacity building may look at opportunities to build public demand for better procurement: making information publicly available will be a key strategy here.

The issue of scale is a factor that needs to be addressed.  Vanuatu is so small that it is often difficult to conduct a procurement that does not involve a related party.  This is exacerbated by the unevenness of economic development, which means that particular families and communities are more likely to both hold positions within government and also be providers of goods and services.  Cultural factors, especially the tradition of gift giving, will also need to be considered.

Attachment B: Baseline Indicator scores

Baseline Indicator

Status and Trend

Score

Compliance & Performance Indicator

Status

Data

Pillar I – Legislative and Regulatory Framework

1)  The public procurement legislative and regulatory framework.

 

 

 

 

 

a) - Scope of application and coverage of the regulatory framework and public access to legislation..

The legal framework in place which covers all procurements, but it is not easily accessible, free, to the public.

2

-

-

-

b) - Procurement methods.

Competitive procurement method of public procurement and fractioning of contracts is prohibited and there is an appropriate hierarchy of procurement methods.  There are no standards for international competitive tendering.

2

Percentage of procurement (in volume and in number of contracts) carried out through open tendering.

Unknown

Statistics not kept

c) - Advertising rules and time limits.

The legal framework does not make detailed provisions relating to advertisement.

0

(a) Percentage of invitations for open tenders publicly advertised

Unknown

Statistics not kept

(b)     - Average number of days between invitation to tender advertisement and tender opening by type of procurement.

Unknown

Statistics not kept

d) - Rules on participation and qualitative selection

The legal framework does not address participation and qualitative selection.

0

Percentage of open tender documents that include provisions barring groups of bidders from participating for reasons other than qualifications or acceptable exclusions.

Unknown

Statistics not kept

e) - Tender documentation and technical specifications.

The content of bidding documents is not established in the legislative/regulatory framework and is largely at the discretion of procuring entities.

0

Percentage of tenders rejected in each process.

Unknown

Statistics not kept

f) - Tender evaluation and award criteria

The legal framework is strong in this area, but confidentiality in the evaluation period is not mandated.

2

(a)     Percentage of tenders including non quantifiable or subjective evaluation or post qualification criteria.

Unknown

Statistics not kept

Average rating all indicators

0

-

-

-

7.  Functionality of the public procurement market.

 

 

 

 

 

a) – Effective mechanisms for partnerships between the public and private sector

There are no obvious mechanisms.

0

Percentage of favourable opinion on effectiveness of mechanisms by relevant organizations or agencies.

Unknown

Survey required.

b) – Private sector institutions are well organized and able to facilitate access to the market.

Relatively weak private sector and limited competition.

1

Average number of tenders submitted in each process

Unknown

Statistics not kept

c) – Systemic constraints inhibiting the private sector’s capacity to access the procurement market.

Not possible to assess.

-

-

-

-

Average rating all indicators

0

-

-

-

8.  Existence of contract administration and dispute resolution provisions.

 

 

 

 

 

a) – Procedures are clearly defined for undertaking contract administration responsibilities

Procedures are not defined.

0

Percentage of satisfactory opinions  on performance of the system.

Unknown

Survey required.

b) – Contracts include adequate dispute resolution procedures.

No arbitration or alternative dispute resolution.

0

Percentage of contracts that include ADR provisions.

Unknown

Statistics not kept

c) – Procedures exist to enforce the outcome of the dispute resolution process.

No such procedures.

0

-

-

-

Average rating all indicators

0

-

-

-

Pillar IV. Integrity and Transparency of the Public Procurement System

9.  Effectiveness of control and audit systems

 

 

 

 

 

a) – Legal framework, organization, policy, and procedures for internal and external control and audit of public procurement..

Controls are ineffective and there is high risk of fraud and corruption.

0

-

-

-

b) – Enforcement and follow-up on findings and recommendations of the control.

Audits are not systematically programmed in this area and recommendations are not normally implemented.

0

-

-

-

c) – The internal control system provides timely information on compliance to enable management action.

Not possible to assess.

0

-

-

-

d) – The internal control systems are sufficiently defined to allow performance audits to be conducted.

Internal audit manual exists and is being improved.

2

-

-

-

e) – Auditors are sufficiently informed about procurement requirements.

Auditors are supported by consultants.

2

-

-

-

Average rating all indicators

1

-

-

-

10.  Efficiency of appeals mechanism.

 

 

 

 

 

a) – Decisions are deliberated on the basis of available information, and the final decision can be reviewed and ruled upon by a body (or authority) with enforcement capacity under the law.

There is no specific appeal mechanism.

0

-

-

-

b) – Capacity of the complaint review system and enforcement of decisions.

No complaints review system, not possible to rate.

-

a) Percentage of complaints processed within the time limits posted or set out in the legal framework.

Unknown

Statistics not kept

b) Percentage of decisions taken that have been actually enforced.

Unknown

Statistics not kept

c) – Fairness of the complaints system.

No complaints review system, not possible to rate.

-

Percentage of favourable opinions by the participants in the system on the fairness of the process

Unknown

Survey required.

d) – Public access to decisions.

Court decisions are published.

2

-

-

-

(e) – Independence  of the administrative review body.

No complaints review system, not possible to rate.

-

-

-

-

Average rating all indicators

0

-

-

-

11. Accessibility to information.

 

 

 

-

-

Publication and distribution of information.

Information is difficult to get and very limited.

1

-

-

-

12. Ethics and anticorruption policy and measures.

 

 

 

-

-

a) - Legal provisions on corruption, fraud, conflict of interest, and unethical behaviour.

No requirements relating to fraud and corruption.

1

-

-

-

b) – Definition in legal system of responsibilities, accountabilities, and penalties for fraudulent or corrupt practices.

Matter not dealt with in legal framework.

0

-

-

-

c) – Enforcement of rulings and penalties.

Weak enforcement.

1

(a) Percentage of corruption accusations that go to trial.

Unknown

Statistics not kept

(b) Percentage of those that actually result in application of sanctions or penalties.

Unknown

Statistics not kept

d) – Measures exist to prevent and detect fraud and corruption in public procurement.

The government does not have an anti-corruption program.

0

Percentage of favourable opinions by the public on the effectiveness of the anticorruption measures.

Unknown

Survey required.

e) – Stakeholders support the creation of a procurement market known for its integrity and ethical behaviours.

Stakeholder involvement is not well developed.

1

-

-

-

f) – Mechanism for reporting fraudulent, corrupt, or unethical behaviour.

No mechanism.

0

-

-

-

g) - Codes of Conduct/Codes of Ethics for participant and provision for disclosure for those in decision making positions.

No code of conduct.

0

-

-

-

Average rating all indicators

0

-

-

-

Author: Administrator